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The Perils of inflation
INFLATION is not a new problem for us, any more
than it is a new problem for the peoples of other nations. Dur-
ing the decade of the 1940's, the purchasing power of the dol-
lar was cut in half. Since 1950, we have experienced several
lesser but still very troublesome spurts of inflation.
My purpose is to discuss the causes and consequences of the
current inflation. Let me begin by calling several major facts
about this inflation to your attention.
First, the general price level—that is, the price level of our
total output of goods and services—has already risen 10 per
cent since mid-1964.
Second, while individual price advances have been uneven,
they have been diffused throughout the price system. Every
major category of prices in both wholesale and consumer mar-
kets has experienced an appreciable advance.
Third, not only has the price level been rising, but the rise
has also been accelerating. Between the first quarter of 1964
and the first quarter of 1965, the general price level rose 1.9
per cent. The next year it rose 2.1 per cent. The year after, 3.1
per cent. During the past year, the increase was 3.5 per cent.
Fourth, the advance of wages has also been accelerating.
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Theaverage increase in the initial year covered by collective
bargaining settlements came to 3.2 per cent for the agreements
negotiated during 1964. The corresponding increase was 3.8
per cent during 1965, 4.8 per cent during 1966, and 5.7 per
cent during 1967.
Fifth, the wage-price spiral has lately been working along
classical lines, with every rise in prices spurring increases in
wages and every rise in wages setting the stage for further in-
creases in prices.
So much for the bare facts concerning the new inflation. Let
us turn next to its causes. To what factor or factors in the over-
all situation can this inflation be attributed?
One popular notion attributes the inflation to the war in
Vietnam. The Council of Economic Advisers has put this ex-
planation as follows: "Around mid-1965, the growth of de-
mand for industrial products suddenly accelerated as the direct
and indirect consequence of the enlarged commitment of U.S.
forces in Vietnam...Theupward pressures on prices and
wages in this period ...trippedoff a price-wage spiraL" This
explanation has an element of plausibility, but it cannot be
readily accepted.
In the first place, the new inflation started before Vietnam
was of any financial or economic consequence. Prices of raw
materials began moving up in spirited fashion as early as the
fall of 1963. By June of 1964, the average level of all wholesale
prices began rising. Between that month and June 1965, the
wholesale price index rose 3 per cent.
Moreover, price advances spread out over the economy well
before mid-1965. During the second half of 1964, twelve of the
fifteen major groups of commodities covered by the official
index of wholesale prices registered advances. During the next
six months, fourteen of the fifteen groups showed price in-
creases. Clearly, inflation had already taken hold and become288The Business Cycle in a Changing World
widespread many months before Vietnam began adding ap-
preciably to aggregate monetary demand.
In the second place, total federal expenditures, as estimated
in January, show an increase of $53 billion between mid-1965
and mid-1968. Less than half of this increase, that is, about $25
billion, is attributable to the war. Hence, if the war expendi-
tures are regarded as a cause of the recent inflation, then non-
war expenditures must be considered a still more important
cause.
In the third place, while it is true that spending for Vietnam
added powerfully to aggregate demand after mid-1965, this
effect could surely have been offset by reducing nondefense
spending or by raising taxes or by making credit more expen-
sive and less readily available to private borrowers. The simple
explanation that the recent price-wage spiral is attributable to
the war in Vietnam must therefore be rejected.
Another popular explanation of the recent inflation is that
business firms have lately found it expedient to use their mar-
ket power—which is a polite term for monopolistic power—
more aggressively. If this were actually the case, it would be
reasonable to expect profit margins to rise. That, however, has
not happened during the past two years. On the contrary,
profit margins in American industry, taken as a whole, de-
clined in 1966 and declined again last year.
The main reason for the of profit margins is that,
on the average, prices of late have risen less than unit labor
costs of production. And this brings me to a third popular ex-
planation of the inflation, namely, that trade unions have been
using their market power irresponsibly during the recent years
of low unemployment.
There can be little doubt that some trade unions have lately
been able to achieve extraordinary increases in wages, just as
some business enterprises have been able to raise prices out ofThe Peflis of Inflation289
proportionto the increase in their costs. But the theory of
labor monopoly does not hold up any better than the theory of
business monopoly.
Between 1966 and 1967, wages rose all around. But where
did the sharpest increases take place? Not in manufacturing,
mining, or transportation—all of which are heavily unionized.
In these industries, the percentage rise was below the national
average. On the other hand, in agriculture—where trade
unions play practically no role—wages rose most. Abnormally
large increases occurred also in retail trade, wholesale estab-
lishments, service trades, financial and the con-
struction industry. Except for the latter, these are industries in
which trade unions are notoriously weak.
The pattern of wage increases between 1964 and 1966 was
very similar to that from 1966 to 1967. The behavior of wages
in recent years cannot, therefore, be explained in terms of
monopolistic power, unless one is prepared to argue that trade
unions have been using their power to restrict rather than to
intensify wage increases.
What has happened of late in the wage sphere can, how-
ever, be explained quite simply in terms of a competitive mar-
ket. As the aggregate demand for goods and services kept
growing, the labor market became increasingly light. Workers
in low-wage industries, such as agriculture and the service
trades, saw an opportunity to get jobs in high-wage industries,
such as manufacturing. The outflow of labor from the low-
wage industries therefore tended to raise substantially the
wages in those industries, while the movement of workers to
the high-wage industries served to moderate the wage in-
creases in that sector. Such shifts in demand, supply, and rela-
tive wages express the normal workings of a competitive
market.
There is an additional fact that we should bear in mind.290The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Contrary to a widespread impression, the real income of the
average American worker has not improved at all during the
past two or three years. Once wages are adjusted for the rise in
consumer prices and for social security and income taxes, what
we find is that the weekly earnings of the average worker in
private nonagricultural employment were actually a trifle
lower in 1966 than in 1965 and again a trifle lower in 1967
than in 1966.
Let me turn to still another explanation of the recent infla-
tion, namely, that the Congress is responsible because it has
failed to accept the President's repeated request for a 10 per
cent surcharge on income taxes. If the Congress had done
what the President wanted, so the argument goes, the increase
in aggregate demand would have been curbed and the ad-
vance in prices would have been much slower.
This explanation again ignores much of recent history. Apart
from the suspension of the investment tax credit, which be-
came effective in November 1966, the President did not ask for
an increase in taxes before January 1967. By that time the
wholesale price level had already been rising two and one-half
years. And when the President did ask for higher income taxes,
he asked merely for an increase of 6 per cent, to become effec-
five at mid-year. In the face of an explosive increase in federal
spending, this request did not convey any great sense of
urgency.
Moreover, within a few weeks of asking for a tax increase in
the interest of restricting the growth of aggregate demand, the
Administration actually stepped up its efforts to stimulate de-
mand. Substantial funds for housing and highways, which had
only recently been impounded, were released by March of
1967. In March, also, the President requested the Congress to
reinstate the investment tax credit for machinery and equip-The Perils of Inflation291
ment.This meant, of course, that the President was now asking
for a substantial tax cut for business firms instead of the tax
increase he had suggested a few weeks earlier.
The abrupt shift in early 1967 toward a more liberal fiscal
policy was accompanied by a shift to a more liberal monetary
policy. The Federal Reserve authorities lowered the discount
rate. They reduced reserve requirements on time and savings
deposits. Most important of all, they now pumped reserves into
the commercial banks at so fast a rate that the money supply
during 1967 grew more than 7 per cent. This was a faster rate
of growth than in any year of the entire period since World
War II.
Thus, despite the war in Vietnam, the government acted
during much of last year as if a recession were under way, in-
stead of coming to grips with the menacing reality of infla-.
tion.
True, in August 1967, the President made another switch in
fiscal policy. Announcing that the nation was threatened by
ruinous inflation, he then requested from the Congress a 10 per
cent, instead of the earlier 6 per cent, surcharge on income
taxes. By this time, however, the Congress as well as the rest of
the nation was quite confused about the direction and purpose
of national economic policy.
Many Congressmen asked: Why is the nation being whip-
sawed by sudden and apparently capricious shiftsin tax
policy? Has the danger of inflation now really become more
acute? If so, did not the Administration bring on this difficulty
by its aggressively expansionist policy since February? If the
Administration was wrong then, can its judgment be trusted
now? And if the Administration is really so concerned about
inHation, why does it not curb the projected increase of federal
spending and thereby reduce the need for a tax increase? It is292The Business Cycle in a Changing World
largely because the Congress has not been satisfied with the
answers that it has received to these questions that no increase
in taxes has yet taken place.
The delay on the subject of taxes may be regrettable. I hap-
pen to think that it is very regrettable. But if Congress is to be
blamed for the inflation which we are experiencing, the Ad-
ministration's entire monetary and fiscal policy must be blamed
much more.
When President Kennedy took charge of our government in
January 1961, there was considerable slack in the economy, but
the price level was steady. In fact, it had been quite steady for
two years.
The new administration proceeded to shape its economic
policy on the basis of an ingenious theory, namely, that by
adjusting taxes or its own rate of spending, the government
would be able to keep the aggregate demand for goods and
services closely adjusted to what our economy can produce at
full employment. According to this theory, as long as a gap
existed between actual output and potential output, it was the
responsibility of the government to stimulate demand by in-
creasing its expenditures or by cutting taxes, but maintaining
in either case an easy monetary policy.
The proponents of this theory realized that inflation could
create an imbalance between production and sales or between
business investment and consumer spending, and thereby lead
to a recession before the gap between actual and potential out-
put was closed. They believed, however, that price increases
could be staved off by getting workmen to accept wage in-
creases that equaled the over-all increase in output per man-
hour and by getting businessmen to set prices so that the ratio
of the price of a commodity to its labor cost of production
would be constant.
The Administration's economic policy therefore came to restThe Perils of Inflation293
ontwo articles of faith: first, that monetary and fiscal stimuli
would serve to expand employment and close the gap between
actual and potential output; second, that wage and price
guidelines would serve to keep the price level stable while
these stimuli were being applied.
This theory worked reasonably well as long as our factories
and mines had considerable idle capacity and unemployment
was moderately large. Under such conditions, an aggressive
fiscal and monetary policy could be pursued without resulting
in a wage-price spiral. By 1964, however, the gap between
actual and potential output had narrowed substantially. As de-
mand began pressing on available resources, bottlenecks de-
veloped and prices rose.
The new wave of inflation did not come without warning.
By the late summer of 1964, a large increase had already
occurred in the number of business firms reporting slower de-
liveries. By the end of 1964, the average workweek in manu-
facturing was already at the level reached during the Korean
war, and price increases in wholesale markets—as I previously
mentioned—had already become general.
The price increases, however, were as yet small and the Ad-
ministration paid no attention to them. The official view was
that the government's economic policy was working out as ex-
pected, that fiscal and monetary stimuli were narrowing the
gap between actual and potential output, and that the guide-
lines were keeping wages and prices in check.
Indeed, since its policy of economic stimulation seemed to
be working so well, the government felt it was desirable to
push this policy more energetically. Thus, during 1965, when
the economy was already advancing rapidly of its own mo-
mentum, the government accelerated the application of mone-
tary and fiscal stimuli, instead of moving gradually toward a
policy of restraint.294The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Practically every weapon in the arsenal of economic stimula-
lion was released during 1965. In that year, we had the second
installment of the cut in personal income taxes enacted in 1964.
In that year, the second installment of the cut in corporate in-
come taxes became effective. In that year, a significant reduc-
lion of excise taxes was enacted. In that year, spending on pro-
grams of the Great Society was enlarged. In that year, the rate
of increase of the money supply and of bank credit was
stepped up sharply. All this happened despite the expansion of
federal spending on account of Vietnam.
This aggressively expansionist policy did indeed help the
nation reach full employment by the end of 1965, but that was
not the only result. By that lime, wholesale prices were already
4 per cent higher than in mid-1964, and the rise of wages was
already accelerating. As experienced observers had predicted,
the price-wage guidelines proved a fragile barrier to inflation
once labor and commodity markets tightened.
The architects of the policy that produced these results had
promised that once full employment was approached, govern-
mental policy would assure that aggregate demand rose no
faster than the nation's productive capacity. This promise has
not been fulfilled. In these recent years of prosperity and full
employment, the federal budget deficit has continued to
mount.
The yardstick on "which economists nowadays rely to gauge
the degree to which federal finances exert a stimulating or re-
straining influence on the economy is, however, the full-
employment deficit or surplus rather than the actual budget
deficit or surplus. This yardstick of the economist indicates that
the fiscal stimulus applied by the federal government to our
economy has grown progressively, year after year, since 1963.
The record of monetary policy has not been much better.
True, over an interval of some seven or eight months duringThe Perils of Inflation295
1966,the Federal Reserve authorities pursued a restrictive
monetary policy. In the past three or four months, they have
also moderated the expansion of the money supply and credit.
However, the broad thrust of monetary policy during the
past few years has been more and more expansionist. Between
mid-1960 and mid-1964, the money supply grew at an annual
rate of only 2.7 per cent. This rate was stepped up to 4 per
cent between mid-1964 and the spring of 1965, and to 6 per
cent over the next year. During 1967, as already noted, the rate
was above 7 per cent.
It is this combination of an accelerating growth of the
money supply and an increasingly expansionist fiscal policy
that is the basic cause of the wage-price spiral that we have
lately been experiencing. It may, perhaps, be debated how
much of the responsibility for the recent inflation is to be at-
tributed to the Congress and how much to the Executive
Branch. But there can be no escape from the conclusion that
the federal government has pursued an increasingly expansion-
ist policy in the face of practically full employment and a soar-
ing price level.
Now, as in other times of inflation, the administration in
power has been blaming greedy businessmen, irresponsible
trade union leaders, and unruly Congressmen. But the new in-
flation is mainly the result of the excessively rapid creation of
new money and of our unbalanced federal budgets.
Let me now turn, briefly, to the effects of this inflation on
our economy.
In recent years, we have discussed extensively the need to
reduce the poverty which still exists in our land of plenty. This
is an objective that practically all Americans share. Unhappily,
much of the public as well as private effort to reduce poverty is
being nullified by inflation.
There can be little doubt that poor people, or people of296The Business Cycle in a Changing World
modest means generally, are the chief sufferers from inflation.
Poor people rarely know how to protect themselves against in-
flation. What little savings they have are apt to be in the form
of bank deposits, life insurance policies, or government savings
bonds, the purchasing power of which keeps eroding when the
price level rises.
Moreover, since bad health, unemployment, irregular work
habits, and poverty often go together in life, the incomes of
poor people are apt to fluctuate more than the incomes of the
well-to-do. Last year, for example, the number of low-income
families suffering a loss of dollar income nearly matched the
number that experienced a gain. Once we take account of the
advance in prices, it appears that the proportion of low-income
families whose real income has lately declined may well exceed
the proportion whose income has risen. This is a grave in-
justice.
The injustice of inflation is not confined to poor families. In-
flation affects adversely everyone whose money income fails to
respond to the rising cost of living or whose savings take the
form of fixed dollar assets.
Besides these effects, the recent inflation has worked havoc
with our money and capital markets. Last year the Federal Re-
serve authorities made a strong effort to create monetary ease
and to bring interest rates down. They were, however, entirely
unsuccessful. Not only did interest rates fail to come down, but
some rates—notably, government and corporate bond yields—
rose to the highest level in several decades. This rise in interest
rates is proving a burden on many home buyers and others
who find it necessary to borrow.
One major reason for the upsurge in interest rates is that
many prospective borrowers have been fearful that govern-
mental policies would create so great an expansion in aggre-
gate demand that, high though interest rates were, they wouldThe Perils of Inflation297
soonbe higher still. By anticipating some of their credit needs,
businessmen and state and local borrowers have tended to
push interest rates up.
Another reason for the upsurge in interest rates is the widen-
ing expectation that inflation will continue. Feeling this way
about the future, not a few businessmen have been borrowing
on the comfortable expectation that they can repay their loans
later in cheaper dollars. However, since suppliers of loan funds
have likewise been anticipating inflation, they have become
less willing to lend at the going interest rate. A 6½ per cent
interest rate on a triple-A bond may seem terribly high; but
sophisticated lenders know that when the price level rises 3½
per cent a year, the real yield of such a bond is merely 3 per
cent.
The recent inflation has had another serious effect on our
economy: it has hurt our foreign trade.
In the early 1960's our price level was steady, while much of
the rest of the world practiced inflation. In the last two or
three years, European countries have been making a moder-
ately successful effort to restrain the advance of prices, while
we have been experiencing a new wage-price spiral.
This change in international price trends, combined with the
reduced rate of growth of the world economy, has affected ad-
versely our foreign trade. In 1964, we had a surplus on mer-
chandise trade of nearly $7 billion. The surplus shrank to $4.8
billion in 1965, to $3.7 billion in 1966, to $3.5 billion in 1967.
During the past few months, the surplus expressed as an
annual rate has been less than $2 billion.
This vanishing export surplus is a major reason for the dete-
rioration in our balance of payments. Other factors, of course,
have contributed to the deterioration—notably, the large and
increasing foreign-exchange cost of the war in Vietnam.
The sorry condition of our balance of payments has led the298TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
government to place restrictions on how private citizens can
use their money. In January, the President issued an executive
order which limits severely the investments that American
firms can make in their foreign subsidiaries or branches. Com-
mercial banks and other financial institutions are now also op-
erating under regulations which restrict the loans that they can
make to foreigners.
The decline of economic freedom that we are experiencing
may not stop with lending and investing. As you well know,
control of foreign travel by Americans has been under active
consideration recently.
In spite of such drastic measures to limit the outflow of dol-
lars, there is less confidence now in the external value of the
dollar than at any time since 1933. Much has been said in re-
cent weeks about the gold crisis. What we have been experi-
encing, of course, is an international crisis of confidence in
American financial policy.
With inflation proceeding at an accelerating pace in our
country, with the balance of payments deteriorating, and with
the federal budget deficit likely to exceed $20 billion, it was
only natural for holders of dollars to become increasingly con-
cerned about the possibility that the dollar would soon be de-
valued, just as the British pound was last November.
The ifight from the dollar took on such vast proportions that
our stock of gold, which was still close to $13 billion last
November, fell to about $10½ billion in March. As a conse-
quence, the London gold pooi, which had kept the market
price of gold close to the official price of $35 an ounce, was dis-
continued. For a few days in March, Americans abroad found
that some banks, hotels, and merchants were unwilling to
honor their dollars or traveler checks. They were unprepared
for this humiliation.The Perils of Inflation299
Fortunately,the leading central banks of the world acted
quickly to shore up the dollar in the hope of preserving the
present international monetary system. But the dual price of
gold which they established is a very tenuous arrangement.
Even in the short-run, its viability will depend on how we con-
duct our national finances. Other governments now have a
larger voice in our public policies, both domestic and foreign.
They will not cooperate with us in the monetary sphere unless
they deem our over-all performance acceptable.
The dual price of gold gives us some time to put our na-
tional finances in order, but it does not give us much time. And
so I finally come to the critical question: What is the prospect
of bringing our inflation under control and of reestablishing
equilibrium in the balance of payments?
In view of the recent run on the dollar, our governmental
authorities at last recognize that general price stability and the
balance of payments deserve a higher priority in our economic
policymaking than they have yet received. The Federal Re-
serve System is now moderating the growth of the money sup-
ply. The Administration is also showing some willingness to
curb expenditures in the interest of inducing the Congress to
accept the 10 per cent surcharge on income taxes.
It is by no means clear, however, that our government is
even now ready to adopt the measures of austerity that are
needed to siow down the inflation materially.
The tax surcharge has large symbolic significance, but its
real power to restrain aggregate demand has been exaggerated
in current discussion. Not many corporations will revise down-
ward their capital expenditure plans just because of a tempo-
rary 10 per cent increase in their income tax. The effect of the
tax surcharge will be greater on consumer spending. But in
view of the high savings rate during the past year and the re-300The Business Cycle in a Changing World
vival of the propensity to spend in recent months, a large part
of the increase in personal tax payments will probably be at
the expense of savings.
A reduction in governmental expenditures is a much more
potent device for restraining aggregate demand than a tempo-
rary increase in taxes, but there is little prospect of cutting ex-
penditures in the present political climate. Even if spending
plans are cut back by $5 or $6 billion, Federal spending in the
next fiscal year is still expected to rise about $10 billion above
this year's level.
The fiscal measures that are now being seriously considered
might well have achieved their purpose of curbing inflation if
they had been adopted a year ago or even six months ago.
Meanwhile, the inflation has reached a more advanced phase,
the budget has moved further out of balance, and confidence
in the dollar has greatly diminished. In view of the prevailing
political sentiment, it seems doubtful to me that our govern-
ment will practice monetary and fiscal austerity on either the
scale now needed or over a sufficiently long time to subdue in-
flationary expectations and restore full confidence in American
financial policy.
But if we shun the path of real austerity, how will we deal
with the stubborn deficit in the balance of payments? Onepos-
sibility would be to subject foreign transactions to additional
controls and perhaps apply controls to domestic prices and
wages as well. If we travel this road, other countries will re-
taliate with protectionist devices of their own, the efficiency of
our economy will suffer, and the broad result is likely to be a
constriction of world trade and a lower rate of growth of the
world economy.
Whatever we do about additional controls, unless the deficit
in our balance of payments is soon corrected, the new dual
price system for gold will probably collapse. In that event, weThe Perils of Inflation301
mayhave to choose between raising sharply the official price
of gold or letting the dollar find its own value on the foreign
exchange market.
Either answer would mean devaluation of the dollar and
further damage to our international political prestige. [f the
price of gold is raised, the dollar will be devalued with respect
to gold. On the other hand, if the dollar is allowed to float, it
will be devalued with respect to other currencies, unless for-
eign governments choose to support the dollar in the interest
of protecting theft own export trade.
Foreign support of a floating dollar is conceivable, but it is
unlikely to last. After all, a foreign country has an alternative
to accumulating dollars that it does not want; namely, it can
let the dollar depreciate and protect itself by restricting im-
ports from the United States. In the end, a floating dollar
would probably result in extensive unsettlement of business,
new restrictions on international transactions, and political
turmoil.
On the other hand, an increase in the price of gold would
leave the present system of foreign exchange rates virtually in-
tact, so that business could go on as before. This expedient is
subject, however, to political criticism, since Russia, China,
France, South Africa, and thousands of private speculators to
boot, would reap a windfall profit. Moreover, while a substan-
tial increase in the price of gold would give us time to work
toward a policy of financial prudence, it will not give us elbow
room indefinitely. Once the dollar has been devalued with re-
spect to gold, the financial community will be very alert to the
possibility of a second devaluation.
I would like to think that we will be fortunate enough to es-
cape such unhappy developments. Perhaps, the war in Viet-
nam will come to an end soon and bring larger relief both to
the federal budget and to the balance of payments than now302TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
seems likely. Perhaps, foreign countries will step up theft own
rates of inflation and thereby aid our balance of payments.
Perhaps, we will even be willing to practice real austerity.
We cannot count, however, on such favorable developments,
and we need to ponder realistically the choices before us. The
uncertainties are great. But as far as I can now judge, if we are
unwilling to practice austerity on a sufficient scale, then an in-
crease in the price of gold may be the wisest course open to
us.
One thing is clear. When a nation permits its economy to be-
come engulfed by inflation, policymakers no longer have any
good choices. That is the tough legacy and also the chief peril
of inflation.